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PANEL DRAFT

OCI No. 1590/63

1 August 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Peiping Fights for Support in the World
Communist Movement

1. The now naked display of enmity and conflict between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, and the obvious futility of their recently concluded talks, have brought into sharp focus their unrelenting contest for leadership of the international Communist movement. In the talks, neither side showed any interest in finding a formula that would allow for a gradual subsidence of their bitter contest, but rather attempted to turn this tactical phase of their deepening conflict to advantage. With an eye to the most interested audience and the major prize to be won--the world Communist parties--each side during the talks turned its massive propaganda apparatus to the task of blackening the other. Each attempted to turn even the rank and file of the other party against its own leaders. The Chinese have been particularly active around the world in openly distributing their polemical material to other parties in hopes of sparking revolts where the leadership is pro-Soviet.

2. With the smokescreen behind which they have attempted to camouflage their activities now dissipated, each side is now courting support from other Communist parties with intensified ardor. The impact of their invigorated competition is correspondingly increasing.

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The Asian Parties


3. Of most significance in this area has been the increased drift of the North Vietnamese party away from neutrality and toward fuller support of Peiping's views. The North Vietnamese may have been propelled by a combination of external and internal pressures to weight the delicate balance they had maintained in Peiping's favor. Moscow's recent moves toward apparent closer cooperation and partial détente with the US probably have been influential in causing the change in tone in Hanoi's discussions of the issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi probably fears that any Soviet-US political agreements (as, for example, the nuclear test ban) would seriously undercut external Communist support of the Viet Cong insurrection in South Vietnam--the success of which is one of its prime national objectives. The shift toward the Chinese probably also reflects a growth in the influence of the extremist wing of North Vietnamese party leaders. The pro-Peiping views of this faction have become increasingly open during the last few months, while the wing of the party that is inclined to favor Soviet views has largely fallen silent.

4. The North Vietnamese traditionally have demonstrated a strong concern over the potentially dire effect of a bloc split on world communism, and such fears doubtless continue to play a major role in their thinking. They have shown a penchant for temperate language, and it is likely that the tone of their propaganda on the dispute will remain less harsh than North Korea's blatantly pro-Chinese comments. The North Vietnamese will attempt to maintain their independent position as long as possible. Recent developments, however, have made firmer the tentative conclusion reached in our earlier paper--if the North Vietnamese have to face up to the necessity for a final choice they will opt for the Chinese side.


5. In two small Asian Communist parties outside the bloc, pro-Moscow leaders are facing an increasingly serious challenge from Peiping-supported

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
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activists in the lower ranks. In Ceylon, the Communist Party politburo has reportedly suspended enrollment of new party members for fear that left-wing efforts to oust the present leadership were gaining momentum among junior party members. Dissension in Ceylon's Communist Party is apparently on the increase, and party leaders postponed last December's party congress indefinitely to avoid an airing of Sino-Soviet differences.



7. After the Cuban crisis in October, the tone of Cuban leaders' speeches was deliberately favorable to the Chinese. Whether this reflected disenchantment with the treatment they had received at Soviet hands, or was an attempt to pressure new commitments from Khrushchev, or was a bubbling to the surface of views which many Cubans hold but repress out of consideration of their dependence on the Soviet Union for economic and political support is not known. It probably rose out of the intermingling of these three, and other complex, reasons. In any event, Castro's month-long May visit to the USSR, where he was accorded an unprecedented public display of good will, seems to have had the effect desired by Khrushchev. Castro's hurt pride was

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clearly assuaged, and, more importantly, Cuba apparently received economic and military commitments from the USSR sufficiently great to induce it to support Soviet positions on many issues. Although Cuba now is supporting the Soviet Union, the volatile and unpredictable nature of Castro's personality makes it unsafe to assign this as its permanent role, and we do not expect to hear Cuban echoes of direct Soviet attacks on the Chinese.

8. Efforts by the Chinese to exploit longstanding factional strife within Communist parties is best exemplified on the Latin American scene in Ecuador, where since May a new open split has developed in the party.

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The recent seizure of power in Ecuador by a military junta and the subsequent outlawing of the Ecuadorean Communist Party will probably be of considerable assistance to the militant faction in the internal party struggle.

9. Elsewhere in Latin America the Chinese are stepping up their efforts. In Brazil and Mexico, where splits in the parties were noted in our 8 May memorandum, the situation continues to deteriorate. In other parties, particularly in Uruguay, Chile, and Peru, continuing problems of minority rank and file dissatisfaction plague the pro-Soviet leadership.

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Western Europe

10. The Chinese have been as active in Western Europe as in other areas which would be thought to hold greater promise for their efforts. Peiping's optimism concerning its present and future prospects in the world movement was given impetus recently by the tactical victory it scored in Belgium. Provided with money and support by the Chinese

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11. The factions and splinter groups which Peiping is so busily encouraging and supporting have an importance out of proportion to their size. The Chinese appear to be contemplating, with increasing complacency, the prospect of a formal split of the international Communist movement into two parts. Small though the pro-Peiping factions of various national parties might be, the Chinese could then invite all "true Marxist-Leninists" to the founding conference of a new International, claiming "world-wide support" against the revisionist and discredited group led by the Soviet Union.

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